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STATE TAXATION OF STOCK.
rights. If any one wishes to know what equity means when using the
phrase, "that one having two securities shall not disappoint him who
has but one," let him read the decree in Arhor v. Laney, 2 Atk., which
will be found in the noted. It means when you have got your money
which you are entitled to get out of whatever security you have, and
with your mode of doing this we cannot interfere, turn over the securi-
ties you no longer need to the creditor that had no claim on them, but
had a claim on the one'you have seen fit to exhaust, as you had a right
to do." This is equity, and it is also justice. It originated when land,
not being assets for simple contract creditors, a specialty creditor might
exhaust the personalty and have the land free for the deed. It is rather
amusing to see the rule preserved and enforced as against common
creditors whose equity is precisely what that of the disappointed claim-:
ant is.
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State Taxation-Stock.
A State tax on its citizens, governed by the value of their stock in
foreign corporations, is constitutional.
STATE TAXATION Ov STocK IN FoRIGN CoRPoRATioNs.
In one sense taxation is always
on property. In another, always
on persons. Its imposition reduces
the property pro tanto. We some-
times speak of a tax, however, as
being on persons, when, if the per-
son taxed fails to pay the tax, any
portion of his property will be
taken to pay it; and as on property,
when, if the owner fails to pay the
tax out of his other property, that
specific property, and that specific
property alone, will be taken to
pay the tax. Thus, a tax on real
estate in most of the States is a
tax which, if not paid by the
owner for the time being, is satis-
fied by a sale of the real estate. An
12 Peck., 572. The following is- not in strictness an annotation. It
is inserted here as preparatory to the principal Editorial Note in the next
or June number, on "State Taxation on Corporate Franchise."
STATE TAXATION OF STOCK
example of a personal tax would be
a tax on A or B, according to the
amount of stock he nay hold in
cprporations It is satisfied by an
1ttachment and sale of the prop-
erty of the persom who has been
commanded to pay the tax. In
short, the obligation to pay the tax
is a personal obligation, a debt due
by.the individual to government,
and is a tax on the person under
.the, above definition. Now this
distinction between personal taxes
and specific taxes on property is
not one which is in any sense fun-
damental. The distinction aims
simply at the remedies of the gov-
ernment -for the non-payment of
the tax by the owners of 'the prop-
erty, whether it be against the per-
*son or against the property.
There are two classes of distinc-
tions, however, between taxes
-which are of fundamental import-
ance. The first class relates to
their social and industrial effects.
These are in the domain of politics
and economics. With them the
lawyer has nothing to do. The
,second class of distinctions is based
on the phenomena taxed. By the
phefiomena taxed, or what we
may call the "ddtermining phe-
nomena," I mean those things
whose existence calls forth 'the
tak. -To make my meaning clear.
Take a tax on every house accord-
Sig to the number of its windows.
There is in such cases two classes
of phenomena wlose co-existence
• is necessary for the existence of
the tax-a house, and windows in
.he house. .Again take a .tax,
on income of 5 per cent. To this
tax is necessary the receipt of
money, i.e., the power to purchase
commodities. The phenomena
taxed is the existence of a pur-
chasing power just received by a
person or legal entity entitled to.
hold property.-
This last class of distinctions is
important t6 the lawyer in the
United States, because he lives.in
a country where his national and
State governments have' not each
the unlimited right of taxation. It'
is a well-settled principle, in the
expression, if not in the applica-
tion, that a State of the United
States cannot tax persons and prop-
erty outside her territorial limits..
Other 4imitatiQns 'on the State
power of taxation exist with which
,we need not deal. For the one
mefitioned, it will be seen that a
settled priterion, as'to what is a
tax on persons and property out-'
side the Statd, becomes at once
important. At the present time,
however, our constitutional law is
not sufficiently developed to give
us any such principle.
There are three possible cri-
terions which can be adopted. In
the first place, the Courts can say
that any tax paid by a -citizen
within a State, and enforced against
his property in the State, 'if not
-paid, is constitutional, no matter
whether the phenomena, whose ap-.
pearance creates the tax, exists
outside of the territorial limits of
the State or not. Any tax, pro-
vided it was paid by a citizen
within the State,, would .then be
constitutional. For example, a tax
on all the citizens of the State, ac-
cording to the value of their landed
property held. outside the State,
being paid by a citizen within the
State, or if he failed to do so,
through a process of attachment
against his property within the
State, wouldbe constitutional. The
Courts, however, have refused to
apply this principle. The -case given
has never come before the Supreme
IN FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
Court, perhaps because no State
has attempted to tax its citizens on
the basis of their landed property
in other States. In the case of the
tax on foreign held bonds, the
Court reversed tht Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, which had upheld
a State tax to be paid by corpora-
tions on the interest, on bonds of
the corporation held outside the
State, on the ground that the
bonds were property in the hands
of the creditor, not the debtor. "We
might draw from this case the prin-
ciple that the fact that the tax was
to be paid by a citizen of the State
does not necessarily make the tax
constitutional, if the determining
phenomena exists outside the
State. We cannot, at any rate,
assert that this first criterion is
one on which we can rely as de-
termining whether a particular tax
is within the meaning of the term,
"a tax on persons or property
within the State."
The second .criterion might be
that a tax was good while one class
of the determining phenomena
existed within the State. Take a
tax, to be paid by A, of so much
for every dollar's worth of business
he does outside the State' on every
house he owns within the State.
This must not be confused with a
tax on all the citizens of a State on
the business they do both in the
State and in other States. In such
a case, in so far as money 4s paid
because of business done outside
the State, it is a fact whose deter-
mining phenomena exist wholly
outside the State. The case we are
discussing is where part of the
determining phenomena arewithin
and part without the State. The
houses are supposed to be within,
the business outside, the State. We
do not know of any case which has
directly presented the case of a tax,
such as the one supposed. For
reasons hereafter given, we do not
believe it is the true criterion, or
the one to be finally adopted, but
in relation to taxes on interstate
commerce it comes as near to
being the one practically adopted
by the Supreme Court as any other.
Thus, while it is a rule that inter-
state commerce cannot be taxed by
the States, the Court has just up-
held a tax on al1l domestic commis-
sion merchants according to their
sales, which latter, in the case
before the Court, were partly of
goods in other States: Fic~en v'.
Shelby Co., 145 U. S., i, The
determining phenomena there were
the act of becoming a domestic
commission broker and the number
of sales of interstate commerce
partly in other States. The Court
upheld the act because of its fitst
feature. The act was in the shape
of a license to become a domestic
broker. This may make a differ,
ence. ' We do not wish to enter
into that discussion here. Suffice
it to point out that where one of
the determining phenomena exists
within the State, and is not a phe-
nomena of interstate commerce, in
the case of a license tax or fran-
chise tax, there is a tendency to
uphold the tax, even though the
other determining phenomena are
interstate commerce. See B. & 0.
R. R. Co. v. Md., 21 Wall., 456;
State Freight Tax, 15 Wall., 232;
Maine v. Grand Trunk R. R., 142
U. S., 221. For a further discussion
of this question see Editorial Notes
for June next.
We submit, nevertheless, that
there is only one criterion of a tax.
on persons and property within the
State, and that is that all the deter-
mining phenomena- exist, in the
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State. The idea appeals to us that
-we became a natibn for the purpose"
,of establishing the complete free-
dom of intercour'se betieen the
States. The States were left free
to govern persons or property
-within their jurisdiction, but each
-citizen- had the absolute right to
remove not only his person, but
'is property, from the State.
This freedom of the right to
move our-property, or act outside
the State of our residence, is not
perfect if the State can follow that
property or that act, and measure
the amoupt of our contribution to
the State, because we happen to
live there, by the amount of our
property. outside the *State, or the
number, nature or character of our
acts 'outside the State. To tax a
itan on the amount of business he
does outside the State, or the
'amount of his property'outside is
inqiuiiing into his acts and his pro-
perty where a State has no right to
, ii4uire, and the vice of such an in-
quiry will, not be cured by th6 fact
* that for the imposition of the tax an-
inquiry into the acts and property
'within the State is also required.
In other words, if the first criterion
is bad, the second, which makes the
cdnstitutionality of the tax depehd
on the existence of only some of
thedeternmining phenomena within
the State, is also bad.
Assuming this principle as cor-
rect, let us apply it to a particular
case of great practical importance.
It is said by Judge CooLEy, in his
work on taxation, that "shares in
a .corporation are also the shares of
the stockholders wherein he may
have his domicile, and if taxed to
him as personal estate are properly.
taxable by the jurisdiction to which
his person is subject, whether the
corporation be foreign or domes-
tic."
The as ertion is undoubtedly sup-
ported by the cases cited: Great
Barrington v. Berkshire, 12 Peck,
572; principal case (1815); CityBk.
v. Assessor, 30 N.J., 13 (x862); State
v. Bentley, 23 N.J., 532 (1852); State
v. Branin, 23 N. J., 484 (1852);
Whitesell v. Co. of Northampton,
49 Pa. St., 526 (1865). There are
an indefinite number of other
cases.
That this principle is generally
accepted to-day is beyond ques-
* tion; that it is correct, and, there-
fore, destined to stand the tepf of
time may, I think, at least be
doubted. A paper certificate of a
share of stock is a titl toproperty.
A peculiar kind of property; prop-
erty with special rights, .'perhaps
public frbinchises giving eminent
domain, etc., but still property.
Perhaps a peculiar kind of title,
carrying peculiar liabilities and
rights, but still a title. In the case
of a foreign corporation the prop-'
erty may be all without the State
which imposes the tax. The pecu-.
liar rights of the corporation are also
beyond the State which imposes the
tax. All the property then repre-
sented by.the stock may be outside
the jurisdiction. The piece of paper
has no value. Its value is in the
property, the land, the money, the
right of perpetual succession, all of
which are "phenomena," to use
our technical phrase, which exist
outside -the limits of the State. The
paper purporting to: be a title to a
share in a railroad because it is
transferable to A or B" in a some-
what different way than the paper
purporting to be a title to land,
may, it is said, therefore, be taxed.
* Of course, it is not argued that
a State which incorporates a com-
pany can tax each of its -shares of
stock. The phenomena taxed is
the issuance of a share. That
